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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RAYMOND STEWART,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
JOHN L. SULLIVAN and
RICHARD MONK ALLEN,
Defendants and AppeJ,lants.
JOHN L. SULLIVAN,

Case No.
12958

Plaintiff,

VS.

RICHARD MONK ALLEN,

Defendant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
RICHARD MONK ALLEN
NATURE OF THE CASE
This was a personal injury action by plaintiff-respondent
Raymond Stewart against defendants-appellants John L. Sullivan and Richard Monk Allen resulting from an automobile
accident. By reason of plaintiff-respondent Stewart's failure
to answer written interrogatories, his action was ordered dismissed as against both defendants-appellants on April 2, 1971.
On May 25, 1972 and after a series of proceedings before
the District Court that commenced on March 16, 1972, an
order was entered designating that the original dismissal was
without prejudice.
1
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(It should be noted that the heading of this case includes another lawsuit in which John L. Sullivan is plaintiff
against Richard Monk Allen as defendant. This was also a
personal in jury action relating to the same accident as involved in the case on appeal and these cases were ordered
consolidated in the District Court. However, there is nothing
before this court on appeal relating to this second case, and
it was dismissed by order of the District Court dated April
19, 1971. The record on appeal from the District Court is
somewhat confusing. It consists of two volumes with one
supposedly relating to each of these two cases. Some of the
pleadings in the Stewart v. Sullivan and Allen case are in the
Sullivan v. Allen volume and visa versa. Hereafter in this brief,
page citations to the Record (or R.) shall refer to the larger
volume containing a total of 108 pages. Any reference to a
page in the other volume shall be preceded by Sullivan Record
(or S.R.) . Also, the parties shall be referred to by their sur1...ames or as plaintiff or defend ant. )

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Originally, the District Court ordered dismissed the plain·
tiff's complaint as against both defendants. No mention was
made in the order as to whether the dismissal was with or
without prejudice. That ruling remained undisturbed from
its entry on April 2, 1971 until March 16, 1972 when the
first of a series of orders was entered purporting to alter the
effect of the one entered April 2, 1971. The last of these was
0
entered May 25, 1972 and purports to amend the e~fe~ !,
the one entered April 2, 1971 to make it "without preiudJCe.
All proceedings in the District Court commencing with the
2
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April 2, 1971 order and ending with the last order of May
25, 1972 were before the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson,
District Court Judge.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant and appellant Richard Monk Allen seeks to
have set aside the order of May 25, 1972 and to have reinstated the original order of dismissal entered April 2, 1971.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The accident giving rise to this lawsuit occurred on
November 22, 1968 at approximately 4:00 p.m. a short distance south of Lagoon on U.S. Highway 91 which then
consisted of a divided highway with two lanes going each
way. The facts of the accident are in sharp dispute and are
wholly immaterial to the issues before the court on this appeal, as are the nature and extent of the plaintiff Stewart's
injuries, although Stewart's attorney has succeeded in placing
his version of the facts and the plaintiff's injuries before this
court by means of attaching a so-called "Exhibit A" to an
affidavit which he filed in support of one of his motions in
connection with this matter. ( R. pp. 72 through 79)
It is the contention of Allen that he was in no way responsible for the accident and that any dispute or controversy
as between him in his vehicle and Sullivan in his had ceased
a substantial distance north on the highway from where the
accident occurred. Allen's contention is that as he was traveling south in the inside southbound lane with Sullivan also
traveling south in the outside southbound lane and just slightly
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m fr~nt of him, that Sullivan suddenly and without any
warning made a lane change immediately in front of him
that caused the rear bumper of the Sullivan vehicle to come
in contact with the front bumper of the Allen vehicle and
which propelled the Sullivan vehicle into the median strip
where it overturned. At the time, Stewart was a passenger
of Sullivan's under a car pool arrangement and was returning
home from work at Hill Air Force Base.
Stewart's complaint was filed on March 20, 1969. (R.
p. 1) His attorney then and at all times through April 2,
1969 was J. Lambert Gibson. Following certain discovery,
Mr. Gibson filed a notice of readiness for trial on July 27,
1970. (R. p. 38) On September 24, 1970, written interrogatories were mailed to Mr. Gibson by Sullivan's attorney,
Robert E. Schoenhals, since deceased. Shortly thereafter, the
clerk of Salt Lake County assigned the case a trial date of
February 16, 1971. (R. p. 39) Commencing in November
of 1970 and continuing in to early January of 1971, attempts
were made by the attorneys for Allen and Sullivan to have
Mr. Gibson answer the written interrogatories mailed to him
on September 24, 1970. (S.R. pp. 17, 18) With the
trial approaching, the requested information was essential for
any possible evaluation that might have resulted in settlement of the claim. Finally, and on January 11, 1971 and
after no response was had from Mr. Gibson to informal re·
quests that the interrogatories be answered, a formal motion
was filed to compel the answers and to strike the February
16, 1971 trial date. (S.R. pp. 17, 18) The hearing on
this motion was scheduled for January 19, 1971 and Mr.
Gibson was mailed a copy of both the motion and the notice
of hearing thereon. ( S.R. pp. 17 through 20)
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The hearing on January 19, 1971 on this motion was
heard before Judge Aldon J. Anderson. Attorneys for Sullivan and Allen were present but no one appeared for Stewart.
( R. p. 42 ) Based on this hearing, an order was entered
ordering plaintiff to answer the September 24, 1970 interrogatories within 15 days and also striking the February 16,
1971 trial date. A copy of this order was mailed to Mr.
Gibson on January 22, 1971. (R. pp. 42, 43) Thereafter
and since there was still no compliance with the order that
the interrogatories be answered, motions to dismiss were filed
on behalf of Sullivan on March 4, 1971 and Allen on March
6, 1971 with copies being mailed to Mr. Gibson on those
respective dates. ( R. pp. 44 through 4 7 )
In order to give Mr. Gibson a further chance to comply
and answer the interrogatories without the necessity of further court appearances, these motions to dismiss were not
called on for hearing immediately. Also, and during all of
this period that is being referred to, the attorneys for Sullivan
and Allen attempted on several occasions to reach Mr. Gibson
by telephone to discuss these problems with him but were
never successful in contacting him. Since nothing further was
heard from Mr. Gibson and on March 23, 1971 a notice of
a hearing to be heard on April 2, 1971 was mailed to him.
(R. pp. 48, 49)

The April 2, 1971 hearing was scheduled to be heard
before Judge Aldon J. Anderson but the law and motion
calendar on that date was transferred to Judge Stewart M.
Hanson. It appears from the affidavits of both Allen's and
Sullivan's attorneys that they were present in Judge Hanson's
court at this hearing although not at the same time. (R. PP·
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60, 61 and 80, 81) In any event, Mr. Gibson was not present
and the court signed an order on that date dismissing Stewart's
complaint as against both Sullivan and Allen. The order stated
only that the complaint was dismissed and did not specify its
being either with or without prejudice. On this same date of
April 2, 1971, a copy of the order was mailed to Mr. Gibson.
(R. p. 51)
The next court proceeding in this case did not occur for
almost one year and until March 16, 1972. On that date the
court through Judge Hanson signed an order, supposedly "on
its own initiative" in which the court stated as follows:
A clerical error having been made in the drafting
of the Order of Dismissal herein in that said order
omitted the words 'without prejudice' as directed by
the Court, and said error having come to the attention
of the Court,
NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 60(a),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court on its own
initiative corrects said error by amending the Order of
Dismissal to read as follows:
It is hereby ordered that plaintiff, Raymond
Stewart's Complaint as against both defendants, ~oh~
L. Sullivan and Richard Monk Allen, be and it ts
hereby dismissed without prejudice. ( R. p. 55)
As soon as this order came to the attention of Allen and
Sullivan's attorneys, motions to set it aside were filed. (R. PP·
58, 59 and 63, 64) Also, both of defendants' attorneys filed
affidavits. ( R. pp. 80, 81 and 60, 61) In these it was recited
that neither attorney had ever been "directed" by Judge Hanson '
· h out pre1u
· d"Ke " and that the
that the order be entered " wit
only directive from the court at the hearing was that the mo-
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tion was granted and the complaint as against both defendants
was dismissed. Likewise, the minute entry in the docket book
for the hearing of April 2, 1971 indicates only that the
motion to dismiss was granted and says nothing about its
being "without prejudice." (R. p. 61) The record in this
case is unmistakably dear that if the court, in fact, intended
that the dismissal be "without prejudice" that this was never
in any way communicated to defendants' counsel until March
of 1972 and nearly one year after the hearing itself.
After the filing of motions and affidavits by attorneys
for the defendants, plaintiffs' attorney filed a "Motion To
Amend The Order On Additional Grounds." (R. pp. 65, 66)
By this he requested that the court reaffirm its earlier ex parte
ruling (i.e. that there was a clerical mistake) and he asked
that the court also grant the same relief on the additional
ground of 60(b) (7) U.R.C.P. (i.e. that the April 2, 1971
order be set aside for "any other reason" justifying relief).
The hearing on the motions just referred to was then heard
and the motions fully argued by all counsel before Judge
Hanson on April 13, 1972. Thereafter, the court ruled and
the minute entry reflects "***the court now being fully advised in the premises, hereby orders plaintiff's motion be
denied and defendants' motion granted." ( R. p. 84) This was
followed up by a formal written order to the same effect
dated May 3, 1972. (R. pp. 97, 98) In other words, and
at this point, the court had ruled that the original order of
April 2, 1971 would stand as entered, and Judge Hanson
declined to grant relief for "any other reason" and under
60(b) (7) U.R.C.P.
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Of course, this ruling didn't satisfy plaintiff's able counsel and so on April 21, 197 2 he filed a further motion entitled "Motion For Further Hearing Before Ruling Of The
Court." (R. pp. 88 through 90) The only ground stated in
this motion and the affidavits accompanying it was that Mr.
Gibson had been suspended from the practice of law in Utah
on May 14, 1971 and that this constituted some basis for
reversing the court's ruling of April 13, 1971. In fact, it
was discussed among Judge Hanson and counsel at the hearing of April 13, 1971 that Mr. Gibson had been suspended
from practice some time in May of 1971 by reason of nonpayment of his Bar fees. Furthermore, Judge Hanson was the
one who made counsel aware of this fact.
On May 16, 1972, this further motion was heard before
the court. This time plaintiff prevailed and the court on May
25, 1972 signed an order which in substance stated:
That plaintiff's complaint as against both defendants be and is hereby dismissed 'without prejudice.'
(R. p. 103)
Thereafter, both defendants filed their appeal

to

this court.

Another matter is mentioned in the affidavits of Messrs.
Gibson and Schaerrer which involves telephone conversations
they have had with Allen's attorney and the writer of this
brief and about which some comment should be made herein.
In essence, Plaintiff's attorneys seem to be claiming that since
this writer at a time after April 2, 1971 assumed in his discussions with them that the order of April 2, 1971 had been
entered without prejudice, that this should be the interpretation given that order and even though Rule 41 ( b) U.R.C:P.
expressly provides otherwise. The apparent attempt by plain·
8
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tiff now is to ignore Gibson's total inactivity in this case from
November, 1970 to May, 1971 and to somehow contend that
in May of 1971 Gibson was ready to do something on the
case but was dissuaded from doing so by this one casual conversation with Allen's attorney.
Frankly, at the time this writer had his contacts with
plaintiff's attorneys after the April 2, 1971 order had been
signed and up until he had researched the matter in March
of 1972, he was under the mistaken assumption that the
law provided the reverse of what Rule 41 ( b) , in fact, does
provide. It was believed that a dismissal where it was unspecified either that it was with or without prejudice, resulted
in a dismissal without prejudice, whereas Rule 41 ( b) provides that such a dismissal is with prejudice. Until March,
1972 there had been no reason to research the question and
this writer had simply prepared the April 2, 1971 order in
the language asked in his motion and in the language directed
by the court at the hearing. The motion requested dismissal
of plaintiff's complaint and when the court stated that the
motion was granted to dismiss the complaint, this was the
language used in the order. No attempt was made by counsel
to make the order more or less binding than as asked for in
the motion and as granted by the court.
It is difficult to understand how a conversation between
opposing counsel about the effect of the order and after it
was entered could have any bearing on the effect to be given
that order. This writer in no way requested or suggested to
Mr. Gibson in their May, 1971 telephone conversation that
Gibson withhold taking action to set aside whatever may have
been the legal effect of the April 2, 1971 order. As an ex-
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perienced lawyer representing his own client, Gibson was
perfectly free to research and arrive at his own conclusion as
to the legal effect of the order. This writer was not of course
'
'
in any type of fiduciary or advisory capacity with Gibson.
There is no contention by plaintiff that Gibson failed to receive the letters, motions, orders, etc., up through April 2,
1971 and there is no contention that he was mislead about
the legal effect of what was transpiring through the entry of
the April 2, 1971 order. What occurred after the order was
entered should have no bearing on its validity or effect.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DISMISSAL OF APRIL 2, 1971 WAS UPON
THE MERITS AND WITH PREJUDICE.
Unless the plain language of Rule 41(b) U.R.C.P. is
ignored, it is apparent that at the time of its entry, at least,
the April 2, 1971 order was a dismissal of plaintiff's complaint as against both defendants "upon the merits" and with
prejudice. In applicable part, Rule 41( b) states as follows:
Involuntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof. For f~il
ure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with
these rules or any order of court, a defen_dant ~ay
move for dismissal of an action or of any claun against
him. *** Unless the court in its order for dismissal
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this sub-division
and any dismissal not provided for in this r~le, other
than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper
venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates
as an adjudication upon the merits.

10
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Plaintiff had failed to comply with Rule 33 U.R.C.P.
relating to the time within which written interrogatories to
a party were to be answered. The possible penalty for his refusal to do so under Rule 37 (d) U.R.C.P. was dismissal of
his action. This was not asked for immediately by the defendants, but rather they asked for an order directing that
the interrogatories be answered. This was uncomplied with
from its entry on January 22, 1971 until the hearing of April
2, 1971. The court was therefore amply justified in entering
the dismissal on April 2, 1971 either for plaintiff's refusal to
answer the interrogatories or for his non-compliance with the
l'rior order.
Plaintiff cannot contend that the court in granting the
motion to dismiss specified otherwise than simply "a dismissal." The affidavits of attorneys for both defendants concerning the April 2, 1971 hearing attest to this. The order
itself which was undisturbed for nearly a year says only that.
The minute entry in the docket record offers no contradiction
or other specification. It is further evident from Judge Hanson's reversal of the ex parte order of March 16, 1972 by
his April 13, 1972 minute entry ruling formalized by order
of May 3, 1972, that he fully recognized that the April 2,
1971 order was phrased as asked for by the defendants' motion and as orally directed by him at the hearing of that date.
Rule 41 (b) U.R.C.P. states that a dismissal of the type
involved in the instant case "operates as an adjudication upon
the merits," but does not expressly state that it is a dismissal
"with prejudice." It is evident from the authorities that "upon
the merits" and "with prejudice" are virtually synonymous
phrases. Present Utah Rule 41 ( b) and Federal Rule 41 ( b),
11
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in so far as material here, are substantially identical. In commenting about the effect of this part of Federal Rule 41 ( b) ,
Professor Moore states in Moore's Federal Practice, Vol. 5,
Section 41.14 as follows:
Subject to proper qualifications, the thrust of the
last sentence of Rule 41 ( b) is to make an order of
dismissal a dismissal with prejudice. Thus, the last
sentence of Rule 41 ( b) provides that, unless the court
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under Rule 41 ( b) i.e., a dismissal on defendant's motion for plaintiff's
failure to prosecute, or to comply with the Rules or
any order of court, or for failure to prove a claim and any dismissal not provided for in Rule 41 - other
than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, or for improper venue, or for lack of an indispensable party operates as an adjudication on the merits. (Footnote
citations omitted.)
It is evident that if plaintiff is to be relieved from the
bar of the dismissal of April 2, 1971, that it must be done
under the provisions of Rule 60, U.R.C.P.
POINT II
NO CLERICAL MISTAKE CORRECTABLE BY
RULE 60 (a) OR OTHER PROVISION OF LAW
WAS MADE IN OMITTING THE WORDS
WITHOUT PREJUDICE FROM THE ORDER OF
APRIL 2, 1971.
Inasmuch as the final ruling of Judge Hanson on May
25, 1972 simply states that the dismissal of plaintiffs complaint is "without prejudice" and doesn't specify the legal
grounds or citation of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure upo~
which it is based, it may be argued by the plaintiff on this
12
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appeal that the ruling was based on Rule 60(a) U.R.C.P.
That rule allows a court to correct "clerical mistakes in * * *
orders ***" and plaintiff may argue that the omission of the
words "without prejudice" was this kind of a mistake. In fact,
such an order by Judge Hanson was entered on March 16,
1971, ex parte and without any prior notice to defendants'
attorneys although he reversed this order by his later order
of April 13, 1972 formalized by his written order of May
3, 1972.
As already stated by this defendant in arguing Point I
above, there is no evidence in this case that counsel, the clerk
or the court made any error in the manner in which the April
2, 1971 order was worded or entered. The most that may be
said is that Judge Hanson, reflecting back on events in April,
1971 from a vantage point of approximately one year later,
did indicate that he would have specified the order have been
"without prejudice," if he had the matter to do over again.
On other occasions, Judge Hanson did claim that his intention
in April, 1971 had been that it be "without prejudice" although
he readily conceded that this intention was unexpressed if such
did exist.
On these facts, it is clear that if there was any error in
the April 2, 1971 order that it was a "judicial error" and not
a clerical one. The distinction between these two types of
errors is fully discussed in Richards v. Siddoway, 24 U.2d 314,
471 P.2d 143 ( 1970) and it is very clear from that case that
if there was an error in the instant case, it was judicial and
not clerical. The Richards case further makes clear that Rule
60 (a) allows correction only of clerical and not judicial errors.
The latter must be corrected by appeal, writ of error, certiorari,
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by awarding a new trial or by any means specially provided
by statute. See also to this same general effect Blankenship
et al. v. Royalty Holding Co., 202 F.2d 77 (10th Cir. 1953).

POINT III
THE FACTS OF THE CASE DO NOT JUSTIFY
THE PLAINTIFF'S BEING RELIEVED FROM
THE FINAL ORDER OF APRIL 2, 1971 AND
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 60(b),

UR.C.P.

It becomes clear upon analysis of the facts and law relating to this case that if the trial court's ruling is to be sustained that it must be upon the basis of Rule 60 ( b) U.R.C.P.
and specifically subsection ( 7) thereof. In applicable part,
Rule 60 ( b) is as follows:
( b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect;
Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, Etc. On motion
and upon such terms as are just, the court may in
the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: ( 1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; ( 2) newly
discovered evidence which by due negligence could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59 ( b) ; ( 3) fraud (whether heretofore
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic) , misrepresentation,
or other misconduct of an adverse party; ( 4) when,
for any cause, the summons in an action has not been
personally served upon the defendants as required ~y
Rule 4 ( e) and the defendant has failed to appear tn
said action; ( 5) the judgment is void; ( 6) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a
prior judgment upon which it i~ ?ased has been r.eversed or otherwise vacated, or It IS no longer equit-
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abl~ that the judgment should have prospective applicat10n; or .0) any ot?er reason justifying relief from
the operation of the Judgment. The motion shall be
made within a reasonable time and for reasons ( 1 ) ,
( 2 ) , ( 3 ) , or ( 4) , not more than 3 months after the
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.

***

Since the first motion by plaintiff's attorney and following the April 2, 1971 order was not made until April 6, 1972
and more than one year following the entry of the order from
which plaintiff sought to be relieved, it is evident that subsections ( 1 ) , ( 2 ) , ( 3 ) and ( 4 ) cannot serve as the basis for
the court's ruling. These require that the motion be made
not more than three months after the entry of the order. Subsections ( 5 ) and ( 6) of Rule 60 ( b) are obviously inapplicable, leaving subsection ( 7) as the only possible grounds.
Rule 60 ( b) ( 7) allows the court to set aside the order
of dismissal of April 2, 1971 for "any other reason justifying
relief." This is broad language and superficially might appear
to allow, if not suggest, that relief be granted in this particular case. After all, the plaintiff in this case was apparently
personally innocent of any neglect in what occurred. Plaintiff has been denied a hearing on the merits and in a situation
where the liability is claimed to be in his favor and his injuries
are claimed to be serious. No real prejudice has been shown
by the defendants, except possibly the passage of time, and
plaintiff will argue that the defendants will not be hurt if the
plaintiff is given a hearing on the merits. Plaintiff's argument
will continue that courts abhor a forfeiture of rights and an
adjudication barring a claim particularly where there has been
no hearing on the merits.
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On the other hand, it is respectfully submitted that if this
case and record are examined carefully and not superficially,
it will be seen that there is no factual basis for relief to this
plaintiff under Rule 60 ( b) ( 7) or any other provision of Utah
law. It is true that the facts of this case give rise to considerable sympathy for the plaintiff individually and his situation.
However, this factor should not cause the court to ignore or
enlarge the rules, including 60 ( b) ( 7), that the court itself
has laid down for the orderly handling of cases and the administration of justice as it relates to an entire system of law
and not simply to an individual case.
An examination of the record will disclose that plaintiff and his attorneys have never offered any real explanation
as to what occurred from plaintiff and his attorneys' standpoint up to and including April 2, 1971 and to allow the order
of that date to be entered in the first place. The only possible
explanation in the record is from Gibson's affidavit of April
12, 1972 wherein he states: "That following the dismissal of
this case, he had a telephone conversation with David K. Winder, attorney for defendant, and advised Mr. Winder that he
had not answered the interrogatories because he had been tied
up in the Legislature." (R. p. 85) Even here, the claim is not
necessarily that he was so "tied up" but that he told this to one
of the attorneys involved some time after April 2, 1971. Considering that Mr. Gibson did give an affidavit in this case, he
certainly could have elaborated therein as to what he was
involved with in the legislature that caused the problem and
why generally this case was handled as it was up to April 2,
1971. In the absence of any explanation or even an attempted
explanation from him, it seems consistent with established
rules of fact finding to assume for purposes of this case that
16
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there is no satisfactory explanation. There is no claim of illness,
no claim of lack of notice or awareness of the proceedings that
were being had. There is no claim that Mr. Gibson had ceased
to represent the plaintiff or that something about their relationship prevented him from representing the plaintiff adequately.
It is also clear that through the time of the April 2, 1971
hearing and for more than a month thereafter, that Mr. Gibson was fully authorized to practice law and represent the
plaintiff and had been selected by the plaintiff for this purpose.
Plaintiff's present attorneys lay great stress on what occurred after the April 2, 1971 hearing and particularly on the
fact that Mr. Gibson was not able to practice law after May 14,
1971. The claim on this seems to be that this prevented Gibson
from taking any action to obtain relief from the order on April
2, 1971. This argument makes little sense considering that
Mr. Gibson had done absolutely nothing over the period of
November, 1970 through April 2, 1971 to avoid the sanctions
attending failure to answer the interrogatories and where he
could have avoided any serious problem simply by a telephone
call or letter to either of the opposing attorneys or to the court.
More important, what difference could it have made if he had
not been suspended from practice on May 14, 1971. A final
order had been entered April 2, 1971. The time for appeal,
which is jurisdictional, had run prior to May 14th, and even
assuming there was some grounds to appeal. He possibly could
have invoked subsection ( 1) of Rule 60 ( b) and claimed that
some "mistake, inadvertance, surprise, or excusable neglect"
had been involved, thereby giving him up to three months
from April 2, 1971. However, it is obvious from the rec~rd
that neither Mr. Gibson nor plaintiff's present attorneys claun
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any such mistake, etc., existed and, as noted above, they have
offered no explanation or excuse for what did occur which
could possibly excuse his conduct under 60 ( b) ( 1).
Mr. Neil D. Schaerrer filed an affidavit in this case. (R.
pp. 67 through 71) Although Mr. Schaerrer handled this case
with commendable zeal after it first came to his attention, it
is apparent from his affidavit that what he did, and considering
when he got in to the case, can have no logical bearing on the
issues before this court on this appeal. His affidavit discloses
that he was first contacted by the plaintiff in September of
1971. Mr. Schaerrer's first contact with opposing counsel was
in October of 1971. By that time, at least six months had
elapsed from the April 2, 1971 order. Mr. Schaerrer alleges
in his affidavit a number of things that occurred in October,
1971 and thereafter. The attempted implication from his affidavit is that these events after October, 1971 should somehow
serve as a basis for relieving plaintiff from the April 2, 1971
order. These included that counsel for Allen told him in October, 1971 that the dismissal was without prejudice. They
also include the claim, which was undoubtedly true, that thereafter he did considerable work. He further alleges that he
delayed for some time, and perhaps as long as six months, the
filing of a formal motion because he believed that the dismissal was without prejudice. Of course, the implication from
Mr. Schaerrer's affidavit is that since this writer had discussed
with him that the dismissal was without prejudice, this sixmonth delay was therefore this writer's fault and not Mr.
Schaerrer' s.
For purposes of argument, assume Mr. Schaerrer had
immediately filed the motion, not as he did on April 6, 1972,
but instead in October of 1971 and as soon as he determined
18
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~o take any action in the case. What difference could this poss-

ibly have made? There is nothing in Rule 60 ( b) or any other
provision of law that would differentiate between six months
or a year as it relates to the failure to file a motion and seek
relief from a final order in a case such as this. Mr. Schaerrer's
affidavit may have some effect in plaintiff's favor in this case
because it compounds our sympathy for the plaintiff and the
injustice to him and even possibly to Mr. Schaerrer himself.
It should have no other effect since there is no relevance between events six months and longer after the entry of a judgment or order and whether that judgment or order should be
set aside under Rule 60 ( b) . It makes about as much sense to
claim that the plaintiff's injuries have become worse, that the
liability can now be proven more strongly in his favor or even
that he needs the money more, as it does to talk about what
his attorneys did six months after the law, as provided in Rule
41 ( b), had adjudicated that his claim had been dismissed on
the merits.
Simply stated, this case comes down to whether the negligence or indifference of an attorney should suffice to serve as a
basis for granting relief under subsection ( 7 ) of Rule 60 ( b) .
If it can and if this court adopts such a rule, as it must to affirm this case, then it ought to also serve as the basis for saving
a client from the negligence or indifference of his attorney in
other types of situations where the client loses his claim
through a so-called technicality and not on the merits. For example, why shouldn't a client be relieved from the running
of the statute of limitations if it results from the negligence of
his attorney. Should the client not have to bear the faeful
consequences of an attorney's negligent failure to file a timely
appeal? More commonly, should the client be relieved when
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the negligence of his lawyer causes him to lose and by reason
of the lawyer's failure to present the proper legal theory or to
adequately develop the facts?
The issue of whether the negligence of an attorney should
relieve a client from a final order of dismissal was involved
in Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 8 1. ed. 2d 734,
82 S.Ct. 1386 ( 1962). In the Link case the trial judge dismissed with prejudice the plaintiff's complaint after the plaintiff's
attorney failed to appear for a scheduled pre-trial conference.
This order was entered despite a telephone message from plaintiff's counsel that he would be unable to attend because he was
160 miles away and busy preparing papers for filing in another court. Justice Harlan, speaking for the majority of the
Supreme Court and in affirming the dismissal, stated as follows relating to the issue of whether the client should suffer
for what his attorney had done:
There is certainly no merit to the contention that
dismissal of petitioner's claim because of his counsel's
unexcused conduct imposes an unjust penalty on the
client. Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney as his
representative in the action, and he cannot now avoid
the consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely
selected agent. Any other notion would be wholly inconsistent with our system of representative litigation,
in which each party is deemed bound by the acts of his
lawyer-agent and is considered to have notice of all
facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney.
The same result was reached in Schwarz v. United States
of America, 384 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1967). In the Schwarz
case the plaintiff's case had been pending for about five years
and a trial date was set and notification was given to the plaintiff's attorney. On the date of trial the plaintiff's attorney ap-
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peared but advised that he was not ready to proceed and requested a continuance. Upon motion by the defendant, the
trial judge granted a dismissal for failure to prosecute under
Rule 41 ( b) F.R.C.P. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed and stated that it was unfortunate and it recognized that
its affirmance might well deny a plaintiff with a meritorious
cause of action his day in court. However, the court went on
to state:

If the attorney's conduct was substantially below
what is reasonable under the circumstances, the client's
remedy is a suit for malpractice. If the trial court's
commendable efforts to move business on its calendars
are ever to succeed, they must be supported. A client
damaged by such neglect has his remedy against counsel.
Ohliger v. United States of America, et al., 308 F.2d 667
( 2d Gr. 1962) and Newton v. United States of America, 308
F.2d 668 (2d Cir. 1962) were two companion cases in which
the plaintiffs' complaints were dismissed for failure to prosecute and by reason of plaintiffs' failure to answer written interrogatories. In both cases a motion was made under Rule
60 ( b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to vacate the
dismissals and upon denial, appeal was taken. Both cases were
affirmed. In affirming the Newton case, the court in a per
curiam order said in part as follows:
Counsel's breach of duty to his clients is still more
obvious in this case than in the companion case, for
here counsel did not even appear for the Review Call
on December 7, 1960, at which time the appellants'
complaint was dismissed without prejudice for lac~
of prosecution. Counsel contends that h~ was not n?ttfied of the call, but Judge Ryan, in denym? the motion
to set aside the dismissal, found that nottee was duly
21
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given. Furthermore the Law Journal carried notice
of this calendar call. Not only has the appellant failed
to prosecute his suit and to answer the Government's
interrogatories, but his motion to vacate the dismissal
was delayed for another ten months after his suit was
dismissed. The conduct of counsel is replete with dilatoriness which no court should condone; and counsel's
plea to ignorance of federal procedure only compounds
his carelessness.
The federal cases have generally held that neither ignorance
nor carelessness on the part of an attorney will provide grounds
for relief under Federal Rule 60 ( b). See Hoffman v. Celebrezze, 405 F.2d 833, (8th Cir. 1969) and U.S.A. v. Thompson, 438 F.2d 254 (8th Cir. 1971).
The Utah Supreme Court, in dicta, reached the same conclusion in Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., et al., 123 U.2d 416,
260 P.2d 741 (1953) although the facts of the Warren case
were not as close in point to the instant facts as are those in
the federal cases just cited. In the Warren case a default judgment was taken against certain defendants and in the later
attempts by the defendants to have the default judgment set
aside, the issue was raised as to the client's right to counsel and
to be competently assisted by counsel. On that point, the court,
through Justice McDonough, stated:
And although a judgment may be erroneously
and inequitable, equitable relief will not be grant~
to a party thereto on the sole ground that the negligence of the attorney, agent, trustee or other repres~n
tative of the present complainant prevented a fair mal.
Our law is full of instances where the innocent principal
is bound by the negligent agent. It is uniformly held that this
does not serve to excuse the principal. Counsel has found no
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case comparable to the instant one and where a final order
was entered solely through the unexplained negligence or indifference of the plaintiff's attorney and where any court has
granted relief on that basis under Rule 60 ( b) ( 7).

In every instance where the Utah Supreme Court has
granted relief under Rule 60 ( b) ( 7 ) , there have been at least
some kind of mitigating or excusable circumstances which
occurred prior to the entry of the final order and which partially, at least, served as the basis for granting the relief. For
example, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed relief granted
under Rule 60 ( b) ( 7) in Ney v. Harrison, 5 U.2d 217, 299
P.2d 1114 (1956), where the defendant had allowed a judgment by default for a creditor to be taken against her but
where she had been under the mistaken assumption that her
decree of divorce which ordered her ex-husband to pay the
debt required her ex-husband to bear the obligation and to defend the action for her. See also Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite
Co., 14 U.2d 52, 376 P.2d 951 (1962). In the Mayhew case
the Supreme Court reversed an order of the District Court refusing to set aside a judgment by default under Rule 60 ( b).
That case might be cited as authority for the liberality in giving
the plaintiff his day in court on the merits. However, it is to be
noted that the court in Mayhew made clear that the default
judgment should be set aside only under circumstances "where
there is reasonable justification or excuse for the defendant's
failure to appear, and timely application is made to set it aside."
Another Utah case that has bearing on the instant case is
Board of Education of Granite School District v. Cox, 14 U.2d
385, 384 P.2d 806 ( 1963). This case involved Rule 60 (b) (7)
and also Rule 60 (b) (1). In the Cox case the defendant was
23
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

.....

served with process and failed to answer within the 20 days
specified in the summons and prior to the time that plaintiff
Granite School District took a judgment by default against
him. He was not represented by counsel at that time and in
attempting to have the judgment against him set aside, he
contended that he had thought the summons and complaint
was invalid because he thought a judge had to sign the summons for it to be valid. He further claimed that he had been
under the impression that the plaintiff was not entitled to the
relief prayed for in the complaint. In affirming the denial of
the trial court to set aside the default judgment against him,
Justice McDonough, speaking for the court stated the following:
The trial court was guided by Rule 60 ( b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which outlines the
situations wherein a party may have a judgment set
aside. There are seven categories therein only two of
which have application here. They are: ( 1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; ( 2) any
other reason justifying relief from the operation of
the judgment. In his reasons for setting the judgment
aside the defendant has specifically set out number one
above and evidently in an effort to qualify under the
second category has asserted the following additional
reasons: ( 1) the judgment entered was based upon a
void contract for the reason that the same did not comply with the State of Frauds; .< 2) ~he purported. contract was void for lack of consideration; ( 3) the iudgment is inequitable.
Appellant in asserting the Statute of Fr~uds and
lack of consideration has set forth defenses whICh apply
to the merits of the case and have no application as to
why appellant did not answer within th~ time allotted.
We are concerned only with why he did not answer,
not with what kind of answer would he give if he were
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s? incl!ned. This latter question arises only after cons1derat1on of the first question and a sufficient excuse
therefrom being shown.
In the instant case we have an argument by plaintiff's
counsel that is similar to that of counsel for the defendant in
the Cox case. That is, we are furnished considerable information about how good plaintiff's case is on the merits, but no information about why the case was allowed to be dismissed. If
this court follows its precedents, it should not consider the
merits and considering the total lack of showing of "sufficient
excuse" or "reasonable justification or excuse" for why the
April 2, 1971 order was dismissed.
POINT

IV.

THE ORDER OF MAY 25, 1972 MAKING THE
APRIL 2, 1971 ORDER A DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE WAS INV AUD SINCE
THERE IS NO PROCEDURE UNDER UTAH
LAW FOR A REHEARING OR FURTHER
HEARING BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT
AND ONCE IT HAS RULED.
The proceedings that took place in this case during March
through May of 1972 typify a practice that should not be
permitted to be followed in the District Court. It allows counsel
who is dissatisfied with a ruling to simply turn around and
petition for a rehearing, motion to reconsider, or whatever
other way it is denominated and all of which are simply attempts to change a ruling already validly entered. In the instant case there was a full hearing on all of the issues involved
with full participation by the court and counsel. Thereafter,
the court ruled in the defendants' favor and against the plain-
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tiff, this occurring on April 13, 1972. A minute entry of that
date announcing the decision was entered and a formal order
was entered May 3, 1972. This should have ended the proceedings in the District Court. Instead, plaintiff's attorney filed
on April 21, 1972 a "Motion For Further Hearing Before Ruling Of The Court." As stated, the court had already ruled
through its minute entry of April 13, 1972. Also, there was
nothing in this new motion of plaintiff's attorney or the
affidavits accompanying it that had not already been considered
by the court. This motion did claim to raise the new factual
issue that Mr. Gibson had been suspended from the practice
of law on May 14, 1971. This was hardly new since it had
been discussed at the April 13, 1971 hearing and Judge Hanson
had been the one who had advised counsel of this fact. Moreover, and for reasons argued under Point III above, whether
Mr. Gibson could or could not practice after May 14, 1971 has
no materiality to the issues raised before the District Court
or on this appeal.

Utah State Employees Credit Union v. Riding, 24 U.2d
211, 469 P.2d 1 ( 1970) involved a situation where the District Court granted a summary judgment of foreclosure in
favor of the plaintiff and against certain of the defendants.
Later on, these defendants moved to vacate the judgment and
the court denied this motion. Still later, the defendants filed a
"Motion To Reconsider" and this was granted to the defendants without notice or a hearing, in effect, vacating the summary judgment that had been entered in favor of the plaintiff. In reversing the District Court and reinstating the sum·
mary judgment of foreclosure, the Supreme Court, through Justice Henriod, indicated that "* * * we are unaware of any
such motion under our rules * * *" and he concluded the
opinion by stating:
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We think the motion to reconsider the motion to
vacate the judgment is abortive under the rules but
even if it weren't, it was error under the rules ro' hear
and act upon it without notice. We conclude that the
judgment of. foreclosure unappealed from, must stand
absent any tunely appeal.
The Utah Supreme Court in evaluating the effect to be
given the ruling of a District Court has often stated, in substance, that it will presume correctness in the lower court's decision and will grant large latitude and discretion to the lower
court, not disturbing its decision unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. This "presumption" in favor of the lower court's
decision is undoubtedly a very useful principle to be followed by
an appellate court and particularly where the facts are disputed
and where something is to be gained from the lower court's
first-hand involvement with the controversy. However, this
principle hardly applies here. In the first place, there isn't any
dispute about the facts and this court is as qualified in every
respect to rule on the issues as was Judge Hanson. Secondly,
if this presumption is indulged in this particular case, to which
ruling is it applied; the first one of May 3, 1972 favoring the
defendants, or the latter one of May 25, 1972 favoring the
plaintiff. (Dates of formal orders are used rather than the
dates of minute entry decisions.) If the Supreme Court believes
that it is the last ruling by Judge Hanson that is important and
that is entitled to this presumption, then, at the least, the
earlier ruling should be entitled to the same presumption excepting only for what the plaintiff will claim is the additional
evidence that was adduced between the two hearings; i.e. the
fact of Mr. Gibson's suspension from practice on May 14,
1971. Following through with this reasoning, the first ruling
of May 3, 1972 should stand and be deferred to by the Su27
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preme Court unless it believes that the fact of Mr. Gibson's
suspension is of sufficient weight to cause it to reverse the
prior ruling favoring the defendants.
With all due respect for Judge Hanson, it is submitted
that the rulings made by him during March through May of
1972 in this case are sufficiently contradictory that little, if
anything, can be presumed from them. It is submitted that the
Supreme Court should therefore consider and decide this matter on the record before it.

CONCLUSION
On April 2, 1971 and after notice and hearing, the District Court granted both defendants' motions to dismiss plaintiff's complaint by reason of plaintiff's failure to answer written
interrogatories and also by reason of plaintiff's disobedience
of an order directing that the interrogatories be answered. This
dismissal was upon the merits and with prejudice under Rule
41 (b). Prior to its entry every reasonable attempt had been
made to give the plaintiff and his attorney an opportunity to
answer the interrogatories and have the case proceed ahead on
the merits.
On May 25, 1972 the District Court by order purported to
amend the April 2, 1971 order and to make the dismissal one
without prejudice. This was apparently done pursuant to auth28
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ority of Rule 60 ( b). That rule and Utah law generally do not
allow amendment of the earlier order under these facts and
particularly where there has been no explanation or excuse as
to why plaintiff and his attorney allowed the April 2, 1971
order to be entered in the first place.
Respectfully submitted,
STRONG & HANNI
DAVID K. WINDER
Attorneys for Defendant
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